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Equilibrium of Heterogeneous Congestion Control:
Existence and Uniqueness
Ao Tang, Member, IEEE, Jiantao Wang, Student Member, IEEE, Steven H. Low, Senior Member, IEEE, and
Mung Chiang, Member, IEEE
Abstract—When heterogeneous congestion control protocols
that react to different pricing signals share the same network, the
resulting equilibrium may no longer be interpreted as a solution
to the standard utility maximization problem. We prove the exis-
tence of equilibrium in general multiprotocol networks under mild
assumptions. For almost all networks, the equilibria are locally
unique, finite, and odd in number. They cannot all be locally stable
unless there is a globally unique equilibrium. Finally, we show that
if the price mapping functions, which map link prices to effective
prices observed by the sources, are sufficiently similar, then global
uniqueness is guaranteed.
Index Terms—Congestion control, equilibrium analysis, hetero-
geneous protocols, optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
CONGESTION control protocols have been modelled asdistributed algorithms for network utility maximization,
e.g., [10], [11], [13], [14], [22], and [34]. With the exception
of a few limited analysis on very simple topologies [8], [12],
[13], [21], existing literature generally assumes that all sources
are homogeneous in that, even though they may control their
rates using different algorithms, they all adapt to the same type
of congestion signals, e.g., all react to loss probabilities, as in
TCP Reno, or all to queueing delay, as in TCP Vegas or FAST
[9]. When sources with heterogeneous protocols that react to
different congestion signals share the same network, the cur-
rent duality framework is no longer applicable. With more con-
gestion control protocols being proposed and ideas of using
congestion signals other than packet losses, including explicit
feedbacks, being developed in the networking community, we
need a mathematically rigorous framework to understand the
behavior of large-scale networks with heterogeneous protocols.
This paper proposes and develops such a framework.
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Our emphasis is on general networks with multiple sources
and links that use a large class of algorithms to adapt their rates
and congestion prices. Often, interesting and counter-intuitive
behaviors arise only in a network setting where sources interact
through shared links in intricate and surprising ways, e.g., [28].
Such behaviors are absent in single-link models and are usu-
ally hard to discover or explain without a fundamental under-
standing of the underlying structure. Given the scale and hetero-
geneity of the Internet, it is conceivable that such behaviors are
more common than we realize, but remain difficult to measure
due to the complexity of the infrastructure and our inability to
monitor it closely. A mathematical framework thus becomes in-
dispensable in quantifying structures, clarifying intuitions, and
suggesting directions. Some of the theoretical predictions in this
paper have already been demonstrated experimentally in [31].
B. Summary
A congestion control protocol generally takes the form1
(1)
(2)
Here, denotes the set of links used by source , and
models a queue management algorithm that updates the price
at link , often implicitly, based on its current value and
the sum of source rates that traverse link . The prices may
represent loss probabilities, queueing delays, or quantities ex-
plicitly calculated by the links and fed back to the sources. The
function models a TCP algorithm that adjusts the transmis-
sion rate of source based on its current value and the sum
of “effective prices” in its path. The effective prices
are functions of the link prices , and the func-
tions , in general, can depend on the links and sources.
When all algorithms use the same pricing signal, i.e.,
are the same for all sources , the equilibrium properties
of (1)–(2) turn out to be simple. Indeed, under mild conditions
on and , the equilibrium of (1)–(2) exists and is unique
[13]. This is proven by identifying the equilibrium of (1)–(2)
with the unique solution of the utility maximization problem
defined in [10] and its Lagrange dual problem [14]. Here, the
equilibrium prices play the role of Lagrange multipliers, one
at each link. This utility maximization problem thus provides
1Delay is omitted to simplify the whole system. Note that this paper focus on
equilibrium properties that do not depend on delay.
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a complete characterization of the equilibrium of a single-pro-
tocol network and also leads to a relatively simple description
of the dynamic behavior.
When heterogeneous algorithms that use different pricing
signals share the same network, i.e., are different for different
sources , the situation is much more complicated. For instance,
when TCP Reno and TCP Vegas or FAST share the same net-
work, neither loss probability nor queueing delay can serve as
the Lagrange multiplier at the link, and (1)–(2) can no longer be
interpreted as solving the standard network utility maximization
problem.Basicquestions, suchas theexistenceanduniquenessof
equilibrium, its local and global stability, need to be reexamined.
We focus, in this paper, on the existence and uniqueness of
equilibrium. We prove that equilibrium still exists, under mild
conditions, despite the lack of an underlying convex optimiza-
tion problem (see Section III). In contrast to the single-protocol
case, even when the routing matrix has full row rank, there
can be uncountably many equilibria (example 1 in Section IV)
and the set of bottleneck links can be nonunique (example 2
in Section IV). However, we prove that almost all networks
have finitely many equilibria and they are necessarily locally
unique (see Section IV). The number of equilibria is always
odd, though can be more than one (see Section IV). Moreover,
these equilibria cannot all be locally stable unless the equilib-
rium is globally unique (see Section IV). Finally, we provide
two sufficient conditions for global uniqueness of network
equilibrium (see Sections V and VI). The first condition states
that if the price mapping functions, which map link prices to
effective prices observed by the sources, do not differ too much
(the “degree of heterogeneity” is sufficiently small), then global
uniqueness is guaranteed. The second condition generalizes
the full-rank condition on routing matrix for global unique-
ness from single-protocol networks to multiprotocol networks.
Throughout this paper, we provide numerical examples to illus-
trate equilibrium properties or how a theorem can be applied. In
[31], we demonstrate experimentally the phenomenon of mul-
tiple equilibria using TCP Reno and TCP Vegas/FAST in ns-2
simulator and Dummynet testbed. More properties of hetero-
geneous congestion control, including optimality, fairness, and
methods to achieve them, have recently been obtained in [32].
C. Related Work
Our formulation is close to the general equilibrium theory in
economics from which we borrow ideas and techniques [18].
See [1], [3]–[7], [17], [24], [25], and [33] for a fairly complete
treatment of related works in economics literature. A typical
model of the pure exchange economy consists of commodities
and consumers. Each consumer has an initial endowment
vector and its goal is to choose
a consumption vector to maximize its
utility subject to its wealth constraint, i.e.,
subject to
where are unit prices for the goods and
denotes matrix transpose. For each good , demand
and supply are balanced if
A consumption vector and a price
vector are called a competitive equilibrium (or Walrasian
equilibrium) if maximizes ’s utility and demand equals
supply for all goods.
In general, in the equilibrium theory, consumers are assumed
to be price takers. This aspect is similar to our model where
sources do not take into account how their decisions affect the
link prices or each other. Both problems are concerned with
characterizing fixed points of a continuous mapping, and hence,
there are considerable similarities in terms of the characteriza-
tions and the mathematical tools to derive them. The main math-
ematical tools used in this paper are the Nash theorem in game
theory [2], [23], which is an application of Kakutani’s general-
ized fixed-point theorem, and results from differential topology,
especially the Poincare–Hopf Index Theorem [20]. They are
used to prove existence and study uniqueness of network equi-
librium, respectively.
However, there are also several important differences. First,
the effective prices to different sources (consumers) are gener-
ally different in our model, whereas the prices in the economic
model are independent of consumers. Differential pricing is
what makes networks with heterogeneous protocols much more
difficult. Second, in the economic model, there is a concept of
initial endowment that defines both the demand-supply relation
and a consumer’s consumption possibility through the wealth
constraint. In our model, the wealth constraint is replaced by
the link capacity constraint. Third, in the economic model,
consumers maximize their utilities, whereas in our model,
sources maximize their utilities minus bandwidth costs. Finally,
in our model, every source consumes exactly the same amount
of bandwidth at each link in its path ( , for all ),
whereas, in the economic model, consumers can consume
different goods at different amounts. This guarantees that the
demand for every good is exactly balanced by its supply in a
pure exchange economy, yet in networks, the set of bottleneck
links where demand for and supply of bandwidth is balanced
can be nonunique and a strict subset of all links. The property
is the key structure that allows us to obtain interesting
results on global uniqueness in fairly general settings. In con-
trast, global uniqueness in general equilibrium analysis usually
requires very strong conditions, and most literature focuses on
local uniqueness [1], [3], [5].
II. MODEL
A. Notation
A network consists of a set of links, indexed by
, with finite capacities . We often abuse no-
tation and use to denote both the number of links and the
set of links. Each link has a price as its
congestion measure. There are different protocols indexed
by superscript , and sources using protocol , indexed by
, where and . The total number
of sources is .
The routing matrix for type sources is defined by
if source uses link , and 0 otherwise. The overall
routing matrix is denoted by
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Even though different classes of sources react to different
prices, e.g., Reno to packet loss probability and Vegas/FAST
to queueing delay, the prices are related. We model this rela-
tionship through a price mapping function that maps a common
price (e.g., queue length) at a link to different prices (e.g., loss
probability and queueing delay) observed by different sources.
Formally, every link has a price . A type source reacts to the
”effective price” in its path, where is a price mapping
function, which can depend on both the link and the protocol
type. The exact form of depends on the AQM algorithm
used at the link; see [31] for links with RED.2 Let
and .
The aggregate prices for source is defined as
(3)
Let and
be vectors of aggregate prices. Then and
.
Let be a vector with the rate of source as its th
entry, and be the vector of
Source has a utility function that is strictly concave
increasing in its rate . Let
.
In general, if are defined, then denotes the (column)
vector . Other notations will be introduced later
when they are encountered. We call a network.
B. Network Equilibrium
A network is in equilibrium, or the link prices and source
rates are in equilibrium, when each source maximizes its
net benefit (utility minus bandwidth cost), and the demand for
and supply of bandwidth at each bottleneck link are balanced.
Formally, a network equilibrium is defined as follows.
Given any prices , we assume, in this paper, that the source
rates are uniquely determined by
where is the derivative of , and is its in-
verse which exists since is strictly concave. Here,
. This implies that the source rates uniquely solve
As we will see, under the assumptions in this paper,
for all the prices that we consider,
2One can also take the price p used by one of the protocols, e.g., queueing
delay, as the common price p . In this case, the corresponding price mapping
function is the identity function m (p ) = p .
and hence, we can ignore the projection and assume
without loss of generality that
(4)
As usual, we use and
to denote the vector-valued
functions composed of . Since , we often abuse
notation and write , , .3
Define the aggregate source rates
at links as
(5)
In equilibrium, the aggregate rate at each link is no more than
the link capacity, and they are equal if the link price is strictly
positive. Formally, we call an equilibrium price, a network
equilibrium, or just an equilibrium if it satisfies [from (3)–(5)]
(6)
where is a diagonal matrix. The goal of this paper
is to study the existence and uniqueness properties of network
equilibrium specified by (3)–(6). Let be the equilibrium set
(7)
For future use, we now define an active constraint set and the
Jacobian for links that are actively constrained. Fix an equilib-
rium price . Let the active constraint set
(with respect to ) be the set of links at which . Con-
sider the reduced system that consists only of links in , and
denote all variables in the reduced system by , , , etc. Then,
since for every , we have . Let the
Jacobian for the reduced system be . Then
(8)
where
(9)
(10)
and all the partial derivatives are evaluated at the generic point .
C. Current Theory:
In this subsection, we briefly review the current theory for the
case where there is only one protocol, i.e., , and explain
why it cannot be directly applied to the case of heterogeneous
protocols.
When all sources react to the same price, then the equilib-
rium described by (3)–(6) is the unique solution of the following
3Hence, we can effectively modify user utility functions and influence rate
allocations through the choice of price mapping functions m . In particular,
linear link-independent m scale user utility functions linearly; see Theorem
13.
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utility maximization problem defined in [10] and its Lagrange
dual [14]
(11)
subject to (12)
where we have omitted the superscript . The strict con-
cavity of guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the op-
timal solution of (11)–(12). The basic idea to relate the utility
maximization problem (11)–(12) to the equilibrium (3)–(6) is
to examine the dual of the utility maximization problem, and
interpret the effective price as a Lagrange multiplier as-
sociated with each link capacity constraint (see, e.g., [13], [14],
and [22]). As long as and , one can re-
place in (6) by . The resulting equation together with
(3)–(5) provides the necessary and sufficient condition for
and to be primal and dual optimal, respectively.
This approach breaks down when there are types of
prices because there cannot be more than one Lagrange multi-
plier at each link. In general, an equilibrium no longer maxi-
mizes aggregate utility, nor is it unique. However, as shown in
Section III, existence of equilibrium is still guaranteed under the
following assumptions.
1) A1: Utility functions are strictly concave increasing,
and twice continuously differentiable in their domains. Price
mapping functions are continuously differentiable in their
domains and strictly increasing with .
2) A2: For any , there exists a number such that
if for link , then
for all with
These are mild assumptions. Concavity and monotonicity of
utility functions are often assumed in network pricing for elastic
traffic. Moreover, most TCP algorithms proposed or deployed
turn out to have strictly concave increasing utility functions; see
e.g., [13]. The assumption on preserves the relative order of
prices and maps zero price to zero effective price. Assumption
A2 says that when is high enough, then every source going
through link has a rate less than .
III. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we prove the existence of network equilib-
rium. We start with a lemma that bounds the equilibrium prices.
Lemma 1: Suppose A1 and A2 hold. Given a network
, there is a scalar that upper bounds any
equilibrium price , i.e., for all .
Proof: Choose , and let be the corre-
sponding scalar in A2. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium
price and a link , such that . A2 implies that the
aggregate equilibrium rate at link satisfies
Therefore, we get a link with but not fully utilized. It
contradicts the equilibrium condition (6).
The following theorem asserts the existence of equilibrium
for a multiprotocol network.
Theorem 2: Suppose A1 and A2 hold. There exists an equi-
librium price for any network .
Proof: Let be the scalar upper bound in Lemma 1.
For any , define a vector function
(13)
For any link , let
Then, we may write as . Define function
as
(14)
We claim that is a quasi-concave function in for
any fixed . By the definition of quasi-concavity in [23], we
only need to check that the set
is convex for all . If , clearly by (14). When
, the set can be rewritten as
Since is a nonincreasing function in for any fixed
, the set is convex. Therefore, is quasi-con-
cave in .
Since is a nonempty compact convex set, by the the-
orem of Nash [23], the quasi-concavity of guaran-
tees that there exists a such that for all
We now argue that, for all , either 1) or 2)
, and we can take . These conditions imply
(6), and hence, is an equilibrium price.
Case 1: . Since is strictly concave,
is nonincreasing4 in . Moreover, the proof
of Lemma 1 shows that . Therefore, there
exists a point in , where . This
maximizes .
Case 2: . Since is a nonin-
creasing function in , we have that
for all
If , then and are
strictly decreasing in , and hence,
Otherwise, we have from (13). In this situ-
ation, all going through link are zero, and hence, we can
set without affecting any other prices. More precisely,
a (possibly) new price vector with and for
4F (p ; p ) is strictly decreasing unless some x (p) becomes zero.
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is also a Nash equilibrium that maximizes
for .
Thus, we have proved that, for
which is (6).
IV. REGULAR NETWORKS
Theorem 2 guarantees the existence of network equilibrium.
We now study its uniqueness properties.
A. Multiple Equilibria: Examples
In a single-protocol network, if the routing matrix has full
row rank, then there is a unique active constraint set and a
unique equilibrium price associated with it. If does not have
full row rank, then equilibrium prices may be nonunique but
the equilibrium rates are still unique since the utility func-
tions are strictly concave.
In contrast, in a multiprotocol network, there can be mul-
tiple equilibrium prices associated with the same active con-
straint set (example 1). Moreover, the active constraint set can
be nonunique even if has full row rank (example 2). Clearly,
the equilibrium prices associated with different active constraint
sets are different.
1) Example 1: Unique Active Constraint Set But Uncountably
Many Equilibria: In this example, we assume all the sources use
the same utility function
(15)
Then, the equilibrium rates of type sources are determined
by the equilibrium prices as
where is a vector of appropriate dimension whose entries are
all 1’s. We use linear price mapping functions
where are diagonal matrices. Then, the equilibrium
rate vector of type sources can be expressed as
When only links with strictly positive equilibrium prices are
included in the model, we have
Substituting in , yields
Fig. 1. Example 1: uncountably many equilibria.
which is a linear equation in for given , , and . It has
a unique solution if the determinant is nonzero, but has no or
multiple solutions if
When , i.e., there is only one protocol, and has full
row rank, since both and
are positive definite. In this case, there is a unique equilibrium
price vector. When , there are networks whose determi-
nants are zero that have uncountably many equilibria. See [29]
for an example where does not have full row rank. We provide
here an example with , where still has full row rank.
The network is shown in Fig. 1 with three unit-capacity
links . There are three different protocols with the
corresponding routing matrices
The linear mapping functions are given by
It is easy to calculate that
which has determinant 0. Using the utility function defined in
(15), we can check that the following are equilibrium prices for
all :
The corresponding rates are
All capacity constraints are tight with these rates. Since there is a
one-link flow at every link, the active constraint set is unique and
contains every link. Yet there are uncountably many equilibria.
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Fig. 2. Example 2: two active constraint sets.
2) Example 2: Multiple Active Constraint Sets Each With a
Unique Equilibrium: Consider the symmetric network in Fig. 2
with three flows. There are two protocols in the network with
the following routing matrices:
Flows (1, 1) and (1, 2) have identical utility function and
source rate , and flow (2, 1) has a utility function and
source rate .
Links 1 and 3 both have capacity and price mapping func-
tions and for protocols 1 and 2, respectively.
Link 2 has capacity and price mapping functions
and .
In [31], we prove that when assumption A1 holds, the net-
work shown in Fig. 2 has at least the following two equilibria
provided:
1) ;
2) for , 2, , possibly , if and only if
.
3) for , 2, as , and satisfy
By manipulating buffer sizes and RED parameters, i.e.,
carefully designing the price mapping functions , we have
demonstrated experimentally in [31] the phenomenon of mul-
tiple equilibria for this example using TCP Reno, which reacts
to loss probability, and TCP Vegas/FAST, which react to delay.5
B. Regular Networks
Examples 1 and 2 show that global uniqueness is generally
not guaranteed in a multiprotocol network. We now show, how-
ever, that local uniqueness is basically a generic property of the
equilibrium set. We present our main results on the structure of
the equilibrium set here, providing conditions for the equilib-
rium points to be locally unique, finite, and odd in number, and
globally unique. We prove these results in Section IV-C.
Consider an equilibrium price . Recall the active con-
straint set defined by . The equilibrium price for the links
in is a solution of
(16)
By the inverse function theorem, the solution of (16), and
hence, the equilibrium price , is locally unique if the Jaco-
bian matrix is nonsingular at . We call a
5It is pointed out in [26] that there is actually a third equilibrium for this
network where all links are actively constrained. However, unlike the other two
equilibria, the third is not locally stable and hence did not manifest itself in the
experiments reported in [31].
network regular if all its equilibrium prices are
locally unique.
The next result shows that almost all networks are regular,
and that regular networks have finitely many equilibrium prices.
This justifies restricting our attention to regular networks.
Theorem 3: Suppose assumptions A1 and A2 hold. Given any
price mapping functions , any routing matrix and utility
functions :
1) the set of link capacities for which not all equilibrium
prices are locally unique has Lebesgue measure zero in
;
2) the number of equilibria for a regular network
is finite.
For the rest of this subsection, we narrow our attention to
networks that satisfy an additional assumption.
1) A3: Every link has a single-link flow with
.
Assumption A3 says that when the price of link is small
enough, the aggregate rate through it will exceed its capacity.
This ensures that the active constraint set contains all links
and facilitates the application of Poincare–Hopf theorem by
avoiding equilibrium on the boundary (some ).6
Since all the equilibria of a regular network have nonsingular
Jacobian matrices, we can define the index of as
if
if
Then, we have the following.
Theorem 4: Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold. Given any
regular network, we have
where is the number of links.
We give two important consequences of this theorem.
Corollary 5: Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold. A regular
network has an odd number of equilibria.
Notice that Corollary 5 implies the existence of equilibrium.
Although we proved this in Section III in a more general setting,
this simple corollary shows the power of Theorem 4.
The next result provides a condition for global uniqueness.
We say that an equilibrium is locally stable if the corre-
sponding Jacobian matrix defined in (8) is stable, that is,
every eigenvalue of has negative real part.
For justification of this definition, local stability of implies
that the gradient algorithm (19) converges locally.
6It is recently shown in [26] that A3 is not necessary and one can generalize
Theorem 4 to
( 1) I(p) = 1
where L^(p) is the number of links of the active constraint set associated with
equilibrium p. Clearly, if L^(p) = L, it reduces to Theorem 4. This general-
ized theorem also allows [26] to conclude the number of equilibria is odd (and,
therefore, existence) without A3. In this paper, although A3 is imposed, all re-
sults can be viewed with respect to a fixed active constraint set with appropriate
modifications. In particular, the global uniqueness results in Section V directly
apply without A3 since J^ has a similar structure as J except with a smaller di-
mension.
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Fig. 3. Example 3: construction of multiple isolated equilibria.
Corollary 6: Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold. The equilib-
rium of a regular network is globally unique if and only if every
equilibrium point in has an index . In particular, if all
equilibria are locally stable, then contains exactly one point.
This result may seem surprising at first sight as it relates the
local stability of an algorithm to the uniqueness property of a
network. This is because both equilibrium and local stability are
defined in terms of the function : an equilibrium satis-
fies and the local asymptotic stability of is deter-
mined by . The connection between these two prop-
erties is made exact by the index theorem. An implication of
this result is that if there are multiple equilibria, then no algo-
rithm , whose linearization around each equilibrium
satisfies , can be found to lo-
cally stabilize all of the equilibria.
Corollary 6 will be used in Section V to derive a sufficient
condition on price mapping functions for global uniqueness.
We close this subsection with an example that illustrates the
application of Theorem 4 and Corollary 5.
2) Example 3: Illustration of Theorem 4 and Corollary 5,
6: We revisit Example 1 with modified utility functions. Recall
that in Example 1, as varies from 0 to 1/24, we trace out all
equilibrium points. The components and of these
equilibrium points are shown by the solid line in Fig. 3. Other
sources and their effective end-to-end prices also lie on
similar straight lines. Since the network has uncountably many
equilibrium points, it is not regular. To make it regular, suppose
we change the utility functions of sources to
if
if
with appropriately chosen positive constants and . These
utility functions can be viewed as a weighted version of the
-fairness utility functions proposed in [22].
The basic idea of how to choose and to generate only
finitely many equilibrium points is as follows. First, we pick
two points in the equilibrium set of example 1, say, the points
associated with and . These choices of
provide two distinct equilibrium points and . For
instance, corresponds to
and corresponds to , as
TABLE I
EXAMPLE 3:  AND 
TABLE II
EXAMPLE 3: STABILITY AND INDICES OF EQUILIBRIA
illustrated in Fig. 3. Then, for each source , find and
such that (4) is satisfied by the two equilibrium points
and with the new utility functions. This is illustrated
in Fig. 3 where relation (4) with the new utility function is
represented by the curve, and , are chosen so that the
curve passes through the original equilibrium points
and . More specifically, given two equilibrium points
and , choose
The resulting and for all flows are shown in Table I.
By construction, both ( , ) and (
, ) are network equilibria. By Corollary 5, there
is at least one additional equilibrium. Numerical search indeed
located a third equilibrium with ( , ).
We further check the local stability of these three equi-
libria under the gradient algorithm (19) to be introduced in
Section IV-C. The eigenvalues and index for each equilib-
rium are shown in Table II. It turns out that the equilibrium
( , ) is not stable and has index 1, while
the other two are stable with index . The dynamics of this
network under the gradient algorithm can be illustrated by a
vector field. By symmetry, the equilibrium prices for the first
and third link are always the same. Therefore, we can draw
the vector field restricted on the plane to illustrate the
system dynamics. The phase portrait is shown in Fig. 4. The
dots represent the three equilibria. Note the equilibrium in the
middle is a saddle point, and, therefore, unstable. The arrows
give the direction of this vector field. Individual trajectories are
plotted with slim lines.
C. Proofs
In this subsection, we provide proofs for the results in
Section IV-B.
Proof of Theorem 3: The main mathematical tool used in
our proof is Sard’s Theorem [4], [27], of which we quote a ver-
sion here that is tailored to our problem. Let be an open subset
of and let be a continuously differentiable function from
to . A point is a critical point of if the Jacobian
matrix of at is singular. A point is a critical
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Fig. 4. Example 3: vector field of (p , p ).
value of if there is a critical point with . A
point in is a regular value of if it is not a critical value.
1) Sard’s Theorem: If is continuously dif-
ferentiable on the open subset , then the set of critical
values of has Lebesgue measure zero in .
Fix a routing matrix and utility functions . There are at
most different active constraint sets. Let be such
a combination with links. Consider the set of all possible link
capacities under which the active constraint set
is , i.e., with such a capacity vector , an equilibrium price
has if and otherwise. Fix such an
equilibrium point . Again, let denote the price vector only
for links in . Then, is not locally unique if the function
defined by has a singular Jacobian
matrix at , i.e., if is a critical point of . The set of
such capacity vectors under which all links in have
active constraints in equilibrium satisfy
and, hence, are critical values of . Since is continuously dif-
ferentiable by assumption A1, we can apply Sard’s theorem
and conclude that the set of such capacity vectors has zero
Lebesgue measure in . The extension to for all link ca-
pacities clearly also have zero Lebesgue measure in .
Since we only have a finite number of different active con-
straint sets, the union of link capacity vectors that give rise to
locally nonunique equilibria still have zero Lebesgue measure.
This proves the first part of the theorem.
The equilibrium set defined in (7) is closed because is
continuous, and is bounded by Lemma 1. Hence, is compact.
Since is a regular network, every is locally
unique, i.e., for each we can find an open neighborhood
such that it is the only equilibrium in that open set. The union
of these open sets forms a cover for set . Since is compact,
it admits a finite subcover [16], i.e., can be covered by a fi-
nite number of open sets each containing a single equilibrium.
Hence, the number of equilibria is finite.
Proof of Theorem 4: By assumption A3, we can always find
such that for any price and link with ,
we have
Let , where is defined in Lemma 1.
Clearly, all equilibria are in the set . To prove our result, we
will invoke a version of the Poincare–Hopf Index Theorem tai-
lored to our problem [20], [33].
2) Poincare–Hopf Index Theorem: Let be an open subset
of and be a smooth vector field, with nonsin-
gular Jacobian matrix at every equilibrium. If there is a
such that every trajectory moves inward of region ,
then the sum of the indices of the equilibria in is .
3) Gradient Project Algorithm: To construct the vector field
required by the index theorem, let and consider the
following gradient algorithm from to proposed in [14]. The
prices are updated at time according to
(17)
where is an diagonal matrix whose elements repre-
sent stepsizes. A source updates its rate based on the end-to-end
price
(18)
A consequence of assumption A3 is that , for
all under the gradient algorithm (17)–(18). This guarantees a
unique active constraint set that is . Hence, the equilibrium set
defined in (7) is equivalent to .
Combining (17) and (18) with yields the
required vector field
(19)
whose Jacobian matrix is
(20)
where is given by (8). Clearly, is an equilibrium point
of , i.e., , if and only if is a network equilibrium,
i.e., . Since the network is regular, is
nonsingular at every network equilibrium . Since
is a positive diagonal matrix, is also nonsingular
by (20) at all its equilibrium points in , as the index theorem
requires.
Consider any point on the boundary of . For any , we
have one of the following two cases:
1) If , link will be underutilized, ,
and according to (19).
2) If , the aggregate rate at link will exceed ,
, and according to (19).
Therefore, every point on the boundary of will move inward
and our result directly follows from the Poincare–Hopf index
theorem.
Proof of Corollary 5: Since both and are odd,
the number of terms in the summation in Theorem 4 must be
odd.
832 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING, VOL. 15, NO. 4, AUGUST 2007
Proof of Corollary 6: The first claim of the theorem di-
rectly follows from Theorem 4. We now claim that an equi-
librium which is locally stable has an index of
. To prove the claim, consider a locally stable equilib-
rium price . All the eigenvalues of have negative real
parts. Moreover, since has real entries, complex eigen-
values come in conjugate pairs. The determinant of is the
product of all its eigenvalues. If there are conjugate pairs of
complex eigenvalues and real eigenvalues, the product
of all eigenvalues has the same sign as which has the
same sign as . Hence, the index of a locally stable equi-
librium is .
V. GLOBAL UNIQUENESS: MAPPING FUNCTIONS
In this and the next sections, we provide sufficient condi-
tions on the structure of the network for global uniqueness. We
also provide some important special cases in Appendix A where
global uniqueness is set up. In this section, we reveal that, under
assumptions A1–A3, if the price mapping functions are sim-
ilar, i.e., the “degree of heterogeneity” is sufficiently small, then
the equilibrium of a regular network is globally unique.
A. General Result
To state the result concisely, we need the notion of permu-
tation. We call a vector a permutation if
each is distinct and takes value in . Treating as
a mapping , we let denote
its unique inverse permutation. For any vector ,
denotes the permutation of under , i.e., . If
is a permutation, then is also a permuta-
tion and we often write instead. Let denote
the identity permutation. Then, . See [19] for more de-
tails. Finally, denote by .
Theorem 7: Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold. If, for any
vector and any permutations , , in
(21)
then the equilibrium of a regular network is globally unique.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 7 implies that if the (slopes of the) price mapping
functions are “similar,” then global uniqueness is guaranteed, as
the following corollary shows: if do not differ much across
source types at each link, or they do not differ much along links
in every source’s path, the equilibrium is unique.
Corollary 8: Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold. The equilib-
rium of a regular network is globally unique if any one of the
following conditions holds.
1) For each ,
for some (22)
2) For each ,
for some (23)
Proof: If (22) holds, we have for any in
which implies the sufficient condition in Theorem 7.
For the second assertion, fix any in and any
permutations , , in . If (23) holds, we have
which implies the sufficient condition in Theorem 7.
Remarks:
1) Asymptotically when , both conditions (22) and
(23) converge to a single point. Condition (22) reduces to
which essentially says that all protocols are the
same ( ). Condition (23) reduces to , which
is the linear link independent case discussed in Theorem
13.
2) The sufficient condition in Theorem 7 can be conservative
because many may be zero (no source of type takes
path ).
3) These link-based uniqueness results hold for a network
whenever no flow uses more than links.
B. Special Case: and
We now specialize our uniqueness result to the case of ,
. This case is of particular interest as it represents the
smallest network that can exhibit nonunique equilibrium points
if A1–A3 are satisfied; see Theorem 15 in the Appendix.
Theorem 9: Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold for a three-
links regular network with two protocols. If the following six
inequalities hold, the network has a unique equilibrium:
where .
Proof: It is straightforward to check that only the following
six in (38) can have negative coefficients :
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Fig. 5. Region of  for global uniqueness: projection to     plane.
Fig. 6. Region of  for global uniqueness: cross-section cut by plane  +
 = 1.
The condition in the theorem guarantees that these terms are all
nonnegative. By (38), . Since the network is
regular, we have , for all equilibria . Hence,
the equilibrium is globally unique.
A straightforward corollary is shown in the following.
Corollary 10: Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold. For a three-
links regular network with two protocols, if, for all ,
for some constant , the network admits a globally unique
equilibrium.
Remark: If are link independent, then
for any . Hence, global
uniqueness is guaranteed, which agrees with Theorem 13.
We illustrate in Figs. 5 and 6 the regions of in Theorem
9 and Corollary 10. They are both cones. The first one is the
projection to plane and the second one is the cross-
section cut by plane . These two figures clearly
show the bound on the “degree of heterogeneity” within which
global uniqueness hold.
VI. GLOBAL UNIQUENESS: JACOBIAN
In a single-protocol network, for the equilibrium price to be
unique, it is sufficient that the routing matrix has full row rank.
Otherwise, only the source rates are unique, not necessarily the
link prices. In a multiprotocol network, this is no longer suffi-
cient. We now provide another sufficient condition that plays the
same role in a multiprotocol network as the rank condition on
does in a single-protocol network (see also the remark after
Theorem 12).
Let be a vector of real-valued functions
defined on . Let and be its
convex hull. Define a set of vectors as
for (24)
as a function of the set .
Lemma 11: If for every , the Jacobian matrix
exists and for all , then
contains at most one point.
Proof: For the sake of contradiction, assume there are two
distinct points and in such that . Let
where
Then
Hence
Multiplying both sides by yields
The left-hand side of the previous equation is 0, and the right-
hand side is negative under the assumption of the theorem. This
contradiction proves the theorem.
Let , and let be the set of network equilibria.
Then, Lemma 11, together with Theorem 2, provides a sufficient
condition for global uniqueness of network equilibrium.
Theorem 12: Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold. If for every
price vector , the Jacobian matrix defined in (8)
exists and for all , then there exists a
globally unique network equilibrium.
In the single-protocol case, a similar result has been obtained
in [22]. However, for that case, the Jacobian matrix is negative
definite when has full row rank. Then the condition in The-
orem 12 always holds and the equilibrium is unique. In the mul-
tiprotocol case, the Jacobian matrix is, in general, not symmetric
and, hence, not negative definite. Therefore, having full row
rank is no longer sufficient for the condition in the theorem to
hold.
Since we do not know the equilibrium set , the condition in
the theorem cannot be directly applied to prove global unique-
ness. To use the theorem, however, it is sufficient to find a convex
superset of and a superset of such that
for all and . This implies the condition in The-
orem 12 and, hence, global uniqueness. We illustrate this pro-
cedure in example 4.
1) Example 4: Application of Theorem 12 to Verify Global
Uniqueness: We visit Example 1 for the third time but using
utility functions for all sources, i.e.,
for all (25)
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TABLE III
EXAMPLE 4: BOUNDS ON ELEMENTS OF J(p)
Let the Jacobian matrix be
where are functions of prices given by (8). For
example
It can be seen that is not negative definite for general
unlike in the single-protocol case. Even though can be hard
to find, we demonstrate how to find a simple convex superset
of and a simple superset of .
Consider the convex set
We claim that . To see this, let be an equilibrium price.
If , then will exceed the link capacity 1, and
hence, . A similar argument gives . To see ,
assume it is not true. Then
Summing them yields . Hence, the network is
not in equilibrium, contradicting that is an equilibrium price.
Hence, . The argument for is similar.
Using the definition of , we can bound all for .
The results are collected in Table III.
Let
We claim that . To show this, note that
since is the smallest convex set that contains . Hence,
. Since at equilibrium, holds
for any from the definition of . Hence,
and, therefore, .
We now check that for all and .
For any , is the following quadratic form in
and :
If and have the same signs, then since are all negative
from Table III, . If and have opposite sign,
then a sufficient condition for is
Using Table III, it is easy to check that the maximum value of
is
. Therefore, we have found a superset of and a
superset of such that for all and
all . This implies the condition of Theorem 12 and hence
the global uniqueness of network equilibrium.
VII. CONCLUSION
When sources sharing the same network react to different
pricing signals, the widely used duality model of congestion
control no longer explains the equilibrium of bandwidth allo-
cation. We have introduced a new mathematical framework of
network equilibrium for multiprotocol networks, and studied
several fundamental properties, such as existence, local unique-
ness, number of equilibria, and global uniqueness. We prove
that equilibria exist, and are almost always locally unique. The
number of equilibria is almost always finite and must be odd.
Finally, the equilibrium is globally unique if the price mapping
functions are similar (a small “degree of heterogeneity”), or the
is negative definite for vectors in a certain set.
APPENDIX A
GLOBAL UNIQUENESS OF SPECIAL NETWORKS
In this section, we present special networks that have globally
unique equilibrium. The proofs can be found in [29].
Case 1: Linear Link-Independent : When the price
mapping functions are linear and link-independent, i.e.,
for some scalars , it is easy to show
that we have an unusual situation in the theory of heteroge-
neous protocols where the equilibrium rate vector solves the
following concave maximization problem:
s. t.
Therefore, such a network always has a globally unique equilib-
rium when are strictly concave. In [29], we provide another
proof using Theorem 12.
Theorem 13: Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold and has
full row rank. If for all and , for some scalars
, then there is a unique network equilibrium.
Case 2: Linear Network: Consider the classic linear net-
work shown in Fig. 7.
Theorem 14: Suppose assumptions A1–A2 hold. The linear
network in Fig. 7 has a unique equilibrium.
The theorem can be generalized to include more than one
multihop flows, provided they all belong to the same type
and the sets of links they traverse are nested, i.e.,
for multihop flows. This result
implies that the two two-link flows in example 3 are necessary
to demonstrate nonuniqueness.
Case 3: Networks With No Flow Using More Than Two
Links: Theorem 6 implies the global uniqueness of equilibrium
for any network with no more than two links. In this case, the
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Fig. 7. Corollary 14: linear network.
Jacobian matrix is strictly diagonally dominant with neg-
ative diagonal entries, and hence, its determinant is .
Theorem 15: Suppose assumptions A1–A2 hold and has
full row rank. A network that has multiple equilibria must have
at least three links.
If does not have full row rank, then there are two-link net-
works that have multiple equilibria; see [29].
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 7
By Corollary 6, we only need to prove that for
any equilibrium . Since ,
the condition reduces to . Now
where is a diagonal matrix, and
is defined by its elements
(26)
Hence
(27)
Here, the summation over is
over all permutations of the items . The function
is 1 if the minimum number of pairwise interchanges nec-
essary to achieve the permutation starting from ( )
is even and if it is odd.
Let denote an -bit binary sequence that represents the path
consisting of exactly those links for which the th entries of
are 1, i.e., . Let be the
set of paths that contain both links and . Let
if and only if be the set of type sources on path ,
possibly empty. Let
(28)
where is zero if is empty. Since all utility functions are
assumed concave, . Then, we have from (26) and (28)
(29)
This together with (27) implies
(30)
Consider any sequence , , , where is
a finite index set that depends on . We have
(31)
where denotes the vector index and the sum-
mation is over all values in .
Using (31) to change the order of product over and summa-
tion over in (30), we have
where the vector index ranges over
. Applying (31) again to change the order of
product over and summation over the index , we have
(32)
where
(33)
(34)
The last summation in (32) is over the vector index
that takes value in the set
all bit binary sequences . As mentioned previ-
ously, denotes the identity permutation, and
“ ” is a shorthand for “ , .”
Denote by the indicator function that is 1 if the assertion
is true and 0 otherwise. Then, (32) becomes
(35)
where
(36)
Hence, is a summation, over the index , of
terms with coefficients . We now show that only
those terms for which the constituent in the product
are all distinct have nonzero coefficients.
Lemma 16: Consider a term in the summation in (35) in-
dexed by . If there are integers such that
and , then .
Proof: Fix any . Suppose without loss of generality
that and and . We now show that
its coefficient .
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Consider any permutation in (36) that gives a nonzero co-
efficient in
(37)
This means that
and
Hence, since , the path goes through all links 1, 2,
, . In particular
and
Therefore, there is a permutation in (36) with ,
, and for for which
but . This yields a term in
which exactly cancels the term in (37). Since the argument ap-
plies to any in (36), .
In view of Lemma 16, we will restrict the summation over
the index in (35) to the largest subset of ,
where the constituent in are all distinct. Let de-
note this subset. We abuse notation and define permutation
on by
Then let be the largest subset of that is permutationally
distinct, i.e., no vector in is a permutation of another vector
in . The set of permutations is in one-one
correspondence with the set of that are permutations of
a given in .7 This allows us to carry out the summation
over in (35) first over that are permutationally dis-
tinct and then over all their permutations. Notice that, given any
and any permutation , we have from (34)
i.e., is invariant to permutations. Hence, we can rewrite (35)
and (36) as
(38)
where
(39)
In the previous, -vectors and are permutations.
The next lemma converts a condition on into one on .
It follows directly from the definition of permutation.
Lemma 17: For any and any permutations , we have
i.e., for all if and only if
for all .
7The one-one correspondence fails to hold for permutations not in .
Applying Lemma 17 to (39), we have
Since , and hence, , range over all possible permutations,
we can replace the index variable by to get
(40)
We now use (40) to derive a sufficient condition under which
are nonnegative for all permutationally distinct .
The main idea is to show that for every negative term in the
summation in (40), either it can be exactly canceled by a positive
term, or we can find two positive terms whose sum has a larger or
equal magnitude under the given condition. This lemma directly
implies Theorem 7.
Lemma 18: Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold. Suppose
for any and any permutations , , in
, we have for a regular network
Then, for all , .
Proof: Due to space limitation, one is referred to [30] for
the proof.
Since the network is regular, . Lemma 18,
together with (38), implies that , or equiva-
lently, for any , under the condition of the
lemma. Theorem 7 then follows from Corollary 6. An illustra-
tion for the proof of Lemma 18 via a concrete example can be
found in [30].
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